We consider a general formulation of the Principal-Agent problem with a lump-sum payment on a finite horizon, providing a systematic method for solving such problems. Our approach is the following: we first find the contract that is optimal among those for which the agent's value process allows a dynamic programming representation, for which the agent's optimal effort is straightforward to find. We then show that the optimization over the restricted family of contracts represents no loss of generality. As a consequence, we have reduced this non-zero sum stochastic differential game to a stochastic control problem which may be addressed by the standard tools of control theory. Our proofs rely on the backward stochastic differential equations approach to non-Markovian stochastic control, and more specifically, on the recent extensions to the second order case.
Introduction
Optimal contracting between two parties -Principal ("she") and Agent ("he"), when Agent's effort cannot be contracted upon, is a classical moral hazard problem in microeconomics. It has applications in many areas of economics and finance, for example in corporate governance and portfolio management (see Bolton and Dewatripont [3] for a book treatment, mostly in discrete-time models). In this paper we develop a general approach to solving such problems in continuous-time Brownian motion models, in the case in which Agent is paid only at the terminal time.
The first, seminal paper on Principal-Agent problems in continuous-time is Holmström and Milgrom [21] . They consider Principal and Agent with CARA utility functions, in a model in which Agent's effort influences the drift of the output process, but not the volatility, and show that the optimal contract is linear. Their method of relaxing the control space in stochastic control theory, we restrict the family of admissible contracts to a carefully chosen family of contracts for which Agent's value process allows a certain kind of a dynamic programming representation. For such contracts, we show that it is easy for Principal to identify what the optimal policy for Agent is; it is the one that maximizes the corresponding Hamiltonian. Moreover, the admissible family is such that Principal can apply standard methods of stochastic control. Finally, we show that under relatively mild technical conditions, the supremum of Principal's expected utility over the restricted family is equal to the supremum over all feasible contracts. Mathematically speaking, the main technical obstacle for considering moral hazard problems where Agent is allowed to control also the volatility of the output is that, in a weak formulation setting, changing volatility cannot be achieved solely through Girsanov's type change of measure, and therefore creates non-dominated set of measures. We overcome this hurdle and prove that our class of contracts is general enough by representing Agent's value process in terms of the so-called second order BSDEs, as introduced by Soner, Touzi and Zhang [36] (see also the earlier work of Cheridito, Soner, Touzi and Victoir [6] ), and using recent results of Possamaï, Tan and Zhou [30] to bypass the regularity conditions in Soner, Touzi and Zhang [36] .
One way to provide the intuition for our approach is the following. In a Markovian framework, Agent's value is, under technical conditions, determined via its first and second derivatives with respect to the state variables. In a general non-Markovian framework, the role of these derivatives is taken over by the (firstorder) sensitivity of Agent's value process to the output, and its (second-order) sensitivity to its quadratic variation process. Thus, it is possible to transform Principal's problem into the problem of choosing optimally those sensitivities. If Agent controls only the drift, only the first order sensitivity is relevant, and if he also controls the volatility, the second one becomes relevant, too. In the former case, this insight was used in a crucial way in Sannikov [32] . The insight implies that the appropriate state variable for Principal's problem (in Markovian models) is Agent's value. This has been known in discrete-time models already since Spear and Srivastava [37] . We arrive to it from a different perspective, the one of considering contracts which are, a priori defined via the first and second order sensitivities. X t (x) = x(t) = x t , for all x ∈ Ω, t ∈ [0, T ], and the corresponding canonical filtration by F := {F t , t ∈ [0, T ]}, where
We denote by P 0 the Wiener measure on (Ω, F T ), and for any F−stopping time τ , by P τ the regular conditional probability distribution of P 0 w.r.t. F τ (see Stroock and Varadhan [38] ), which is independent of x ∈ Ω by independence and stationarity of the Brownian increments. Let Prob(Ω) denote the collection of all probability measures on (Ω, F T ).
We say that a probability measure P ∈ Prob(Ω) is a semi-martingale measure if X is a semi-martingale under P. By Karandikar [22] , there is a F−progressively measurable process, denoted by X = ( X t ) 0≤t≤T , which coincides with the quadratic variation of X, P−a.s. for all semi-martingale measures P. We may then introduce the d × d non-negative symmetric matrix σ t such that (R), we may define its square root σ t in the usual way. Throughout this paper, we shall work with processes ψ : [0, T ] × Ω −→ E, taking values in some Polish space E, which are F−optional, i.e. O(F)−measurable, where O(F) is the so-called optional σ−field generated by F−adapted right-continuous processes. In particular such a process ψ is non-anticipative in the sense that ψ(t, x) = ψ(t, x ·∧t ), for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ Ω.
Finally, for technical reasons, we work under the classical ZFC set-theoretic axioms, as well as the continuum hypothesis 6 .
Controlled state equation
In a typical Principal-Agent problem, there are two decision makers. Agent has the possibility of controlling what is generically referred to as the "output" process (which in our case is X), by exerting effort through controls of his choice. Principal delegates the management of the output to Agent, and sets the terms of the contract so as to give him the incentive to perform the best effort for the management of the output.
A control process (Agent's effort/action) ν = (α, β) is an F−optional process with values in A × B for some subsets A and B of finite dimensional spaces. We denote the set of control processes as U. The output process takes values in R d , and is defined by means of the controlled coefficients:
where for given integers d, n, we denote by M d,n (R) the set of d × n matrices with real entries.
For all control process ν = (α, β), and some given initial data X 0 ∈ R d , the controlled state equation is defined by the stochastic differential equation driven by an n−dimensional Brownian motion W ,
Notice that the processes α and β are functions of the path of X. As it is standard in probability theory, the dependence on the canonical process will be suppressed.
A control model is a weak solution of (2.1) defined as a pair M := (P, ν) ∈ Prob(Ω) × U, such that P • X −1 0 = δ {X0} , and there is some n−dimensional P−Brownian motion W M such that
In particular, we have
We denote M the collection of all such control models (as opposed to control processes), which we call admissible. We assume throughout this paper the following implicit condition on σ, see (2.4) below,
This condition is satisfied for instance if x −→ σ t (x, b) is continuous for some constant control b ∈ B, see e.g. Karatzas and Shreve [23] .
Notice that we do not restrict the controls to those for which weak uniqueness holds. Moreover, by Girsanov theorem, two weak solutions of (2.1) associated with (α, β) and (α ′ , β) are equivalent. However, different diffusion coefficients induce mutually singular weak solutions of the corresponding stochastic differential equations.
We next introduce the following sets:
As λ is bounded, it follows from the Girsanov theorem that any control model M = (P, α, β) ∈ M induces a weak solution (P ′ , β) for the drift-less SDE
Conversely, for any weak solution (P ′ , β) of (2.4), with an F−optional process β valued in B, and any bounded F−optional process α with values in A, we directly check from the last construction that (P, α, β) is a weak solution of (2.1). 7 Brownian motion W M is defined on a possibly enlarged space, if σ is not invertible P−a.s. We refer to Possamaï, Tan and Zhou [30] for the precise statements.
Agent's problem
We next introduce the cost function
and we assume throughout that
Let (P, ν) ∈ M be fixed. The canonical process X is called the output process, and the control ν is called Agent's effort or action. Agent is in charge of controlling the (distribution of the) output process by choosing the effort process ν in the state equation (2.1), while subject to cost of effort at rate c(X, ν). Furthermore, Agent has a fixed reservation utility R ∈ R, i.e., he will not accept to work for Principal unless the contract is such that his expected utility is above R.
Agent is hired at time t = 0, and receives the compensation ξ from Principal at time T . Principal does not observe Agent's effort, only the output process X. Consequently, the compensation ξ, which takes values in R, can only be contingent on X, that is ξ is F T −measurable.
A random variable ξ is called a contract, and we write ξ ∈ C 0 if
We now introduce Agent's objective function
where
is a discount factor defined by means of the function
Notice that J A (M, ξ) is well-defined for all (M, ξ) ∈ M × C 0 . This is a consequence of the boundedness of k, together with conditions (2.5) and (2.6).
(ii) Given a utility function U A with constant sign, consider Agent's objective function of the form
In particular, our framework includes exponential utilities, under appropriate modification of the assumptions, see e.g. Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi [7] .
In the literature, the dynamic version of the value process V A is introduced by an obvious shift of the initial time, and is sometimes called continuation utility or promised utility. Such a dynamic version turns out to play a crucial role as the state variable of Principal's optimization problem; see Sannikov [32] for its use in continuous-time models.
Principal's problem
We now state Principal's optimization problem. Principal takes benefit from the value of the output X over time period [0, T ], and pays the compensation ξ at terminal time T , as promised to Agent.
We will restrict the contracts that can be offered by Principal to those that admit an optimal solution to Agent's problem, i.e., we allow only the contracts ξ ∈ C 0 for which M ⋆ (ξ) = ∅. Recall also that Agent's participation is conditioned on having his value above reservation utility R. Thus, Principal is restricted to choose a contract from the set
As a final ingredient, we need to fix Agent's optimal strategy in the case in which the set M ⋆ (ξ) contains more than one optimal response. Following the standard convention, we assume that Agent, when indifferent between such solutions, implements the one that is the best for Principal. In view of this, Principal's problem is
and the function U : R −→ R is a given non-decreasing and concave utility function, ℓ : Ω −→ R is a liquidation function with linear growth, and
is a discount factor, defined by means of a discount rate function:
Comments on the Principal-Agent problem (i) Agent's and Principal's problems are non-standard stochastic control problems. First, ξ is allowed to be of non-Markovian nature. Second, Principal's optimization is over ξ, and is a priori not a control problem that may be approached by dynamic programming. The objective of this paper is to develop an approach that naturally reduces both problems to those that can be solved by dynamic programming.
(ii) Similar to the standard literature in stochastic control, the controlled coefficients λ and σ are assumed to be bounded in order to highlight the general structure of the problem, without entering the potential difficulties of singular stochastic control (specific definition of the controls set, lack of regularity, boundary layer, i.e. discontinuity of the value function due to control explosion). Such difficulties can however be typically addressed on a case-by-case basis, see e.g. Fleming & Soner [18] . We emphasize that the general methodology of the present paper extends naturally to the case of unbounded controls, see e.g. Aïd, Possamaï and Touzi [1] .
(iii) Notice that the controlled drift σλ is assumed to lie in the range of the diffusion matrix. When the diffusion matrix is allowed to degenerate, this represents a restriction of the model, which translates to the so-called structure condition in the theory of backward SDEs. The structure condition is crucial for our methodology of characterizing Agent's path-dependent control problem by means of backward SDEs.
(iv) The weak formulation of the problem is standard in the current continuous-time Principal-Agent literature. First, as Agent's effort is impacting the problem only through the induced distribution, the weak formulation naturally allows for a larger class of controls. Second, Principal's contract is crucially restricted to be measurable with respect to the output process, thus capturing the differential information between Agent and Principal. In the present weak formulation, no additional measurability restriction is needed in order to account for this key-feature of the problem.
Reduction to a standard stochastic control problem
This section contains the main results of the present paper.
Family of restricted contracts
In view of the definition of Agent's problem in (2.8), it is natural to introduce the Hamiltonian functional,
Remark 3.1. (i) The mapping H plays an important role in the theory of stochastic control of Markov diffusions, see for instance Fleming and Soner [18] . Indeed, suppose that
• the coefficients λ t , σ t , c t , k t depend on x only through the current value x t ,
• the contract ξ depends on x only through the final value x T , i.e. ξ(x) = g(x T ) for some g : 
A recently developed theory of path-dependent partial differential equations extends the approach to the nonMarkovian case, see Ekren, Touzi and Zhang [11, 12] .
(ii) We may also introduce the dynamic value function of Agent V t (ξ) by moving initial time to t. In the Markovian setting of (i), assuming further that the solution v of the HJB equation is C 1,2 , we have
and we obtain by Itô's formula the following representation of ξ(x) = g(x T ):
This provides the motivation for our approach, inspired from Sannikov [32] : use the dynamic programming principle satisfied by the value process V (ξ) so as to derive a representation of the contract ξ under the form (3.3).
We next introduce the norms
, and Y
for any F−predictable, R d −valued process Z and any F−optional, R−valued process Y with càdlàg paths. The following subset of contracts will play a crucial role in our analysis.
Condition (i) guarantees that the process Y Z,Γ of (3.4) is well-defined P−a.s. for all P ∈ P. Indeed, provided that the integrals on the right hand side are well-defined, notice that, the Hamiltonian H is Lipschitz in the y−variable, due to k being bounded, thus guaranteeing that Y Z,Γ is well-defined as the unique solution of the ODE with random coefficients (3.4). Next, to see that the integrals are indeed well-defined, we observe that
where A ν is a non-decreasing process defined by
Hence, the integrability conditions in Definition 3.2 (i) guarantee that (3.4) is well-defined P−a.s., for all P ∈ P. Then, Y Z,Γ is well-defined by the admissibility condition (2.5). We emphasize that t 0 Z r · dX r is defined pathwisely on Ω without exclusion of any null set, as a consequence of the main result of Nutz [27] . This is a crucial fact as our main result below states that Principal's problem can be reduced to choosing among contracts of the form ξ = Y Z,Γ T , which requires that such contracts be independent from Agent's control model 8 .
Condition (ii) states that there is a maximizer of the Hamiltonian H, defined in (3.1), which induces an admissible control model for Agent's problem. This is a standard technical condition for our verification argument in Proposition 3.3 below, which is the key-ingredient for our main result. Under this condition, the next result states that, under contracts of the form ξ = Y Z,Γ T , Agent's value function coincides with the above process Y Z,Γ , and the corresponding optimal actions are identified as the maximizers of the Hamiltonian H.
∈ C 0 , and we have: We next prove (i). First, for any M = (P, ν) ∈ M, it follows from a direct application of Itô's formula that
where we used the simplifying notation ϕ u r := ϕ r (x, u) for ϕ = k, σ, λ, and where we have used the fact that since (Z, Γ) ∈ V 0 , the stochastic integral 
By the definition of the Hamiltonian H in (3.1), this shows that
≤ Y 0 by the arbitrariness of M ∈ M. Finally, using the control (P Z,Γ , ν Z,Γ ) introduced in the admissibility condition (ii) of Definition 3.2, we see that (3.7) reduces to
We next prove (ii). It follows from (3.7) and the equality
By the definition of H in (3.1), this holds if and only if ν ⋆ is a maximizer of
implies that our set P is not dominated. It is therefore necessary for our approach to have a path-wise definition of stochastic integrals.
Notice that the classical path-wise stochastic integration results of Bichteler [2] (see also Karandikar [22] ) are not sufficient for our purpose, as we would need to restrict the process Z to have further pathwise regularity. The recent result of Nutz [27] is perfectly suitable to our context, but uses the notion of medial limits to define the stochastic integral of any predictable process with respect to any càdlàg semi-martingale whose characteristic triplet is absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed reference measure. The existence of medial limits is not guaranteed under the usual set-theoretic framework ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms plus the uncountable axiom of choice), and further axioms have to be added. The continuum hypothesis is one among several sufficient axioms for existence of these limits to hold, see [30, Footnote 3] for further discussion.
has at least one weak solution (
The following result on Principal's value process V P when the contract payoff is ξ = Y Z,Γ T is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.3, and uses the convention that sup ∅ = −∞. Proposition 3.4. We have
Our main result below identifies conditions under which the lower bound sup Y0≥R V (Y 0 ), representing the maximum Principal's value when the contracts are restricted to the
where ∂ z and ∂ γ denote the sub-gradient with respect to z and γ, respectively. If in addition H is differentiable in z and γ, and the Hamiltonian has an interior maximizer characterized by the first order condition, then we may rewrite the state equation (3.9) as
We are now ready for the statement of our main result. Theorem 3.6. Assume that V = ∅. Then, we have Theorem 3.6 reduces our non-zero sum Stackelberg stochastic differential game to a finite dimensional maximization of the value function of a standard stochastic control problem which may be addressed by standard tools from stochastic control theory, see Subsection 3.3. This reduction is obtained by proving that the restriction of the class of contracts from Ξ to the set Y Z,Γ T , Y 0 ≥ R, (Z, Γ) ∈ V does not affect Principal's value function.
-The simplest sufficient condition is to show that any ξ ∈ Ξ can be represented as ξ = Y Z,Γ T , P−a.s. for all P ∈ P 0 . We shall see in the subsequent subsection that this is, indeed, the case when the volatility coefficient is not controlled and generates a weak solution satisfying the predictable representation property.
-In the general case of Subsection 5, we shall prove that the last representation result holds for a convenient approximation ξ ε of ξ, which will allow Principal to attain the optimal value.
Remark 3.7. The assumption that V is non-empty is important in our case, because otherwise the reduced problem of the Principal would degenerate and have value −∞. Notice however that this is a rather mild assumption. For instance, we may ensure that the pair (Z, Γ) = (0, 0), inducing constant contracts, belongs to V, by by restricting Agent's cost function c to be strictly convex, coercive, with appropriate regularity.
Remark 3.8. The special case where Agent has no action on the diffusion matrix, with an induced weak solution satisfying the predictable representation property, is addressed by a direct application of a representation result from the theory of backward SDEs. We isolate this setting in Section 4 below, see Theorem 4.2.
HJB characterization of the reduced problem
An advantage of our approach is that, assuming the restriction P ⋆ (Y Z,Γ T ) = ∅ is satisfied and that processes in V satisfy the admissibility condition of Definition 3.2 (ii), V is a standard stochastic control problem with control processes (Z, Γ), and controlled state process (X, Y Z,Γ ), the controlled dynamics of X given (in weak formulation) by (3.9) , and those of Y Z,Γ given by (3.4) dY where M =:
The next statement provides a verification result for the problem V in the Markovian case. As standard in the stochastic control literature, this requires to assume existence of the maximizerŝ z(t, x, y, p, M ) andγ(t, x, y, p, M ), 
be a classical solution of the dynamic programming equation
Assume further that
is an optimal control for the problem V .
In general, we see that Principal's problem involves both x and y as state variables. We consider below in Section 6 conditions under which the number of state variables can be reduced.
Before closing this section, let us say a few words about the existence of an optimal contract. As mentioned in Theorem 3.9 above, this boils down to the value function v being regular enough so as to give a meaning to its partial derivatives with respect to x (for instance weak derivatives in the Sobolev sense could, in principle, be sufficient), and to use them as feedback in SDE (3.9)-(3.11). In this regard, the question of existence of an optimal contract is the same as the question of existence in a generic stochastic control problem; see, e.g., the seminal papers of El Karoui, Huu Nguyen and Jeanblanc-Picqué [13] , and Haussman and Lepeltier [19] .
Fixed volatility of the output
We consider here the case in which Agent is only allowed to control the drift of the output process, i.e. B = {b o }. In this case, we simply denote control models in M by M = (P, α). Clearly, M is non-empty if and only if the drift-less SDE (2.4) where the filtration F P ′ + is the P ′ −completion of the right-limit of F 9 . We observe that all existing literature on the continuous time Principle-Agent problem falls under this framework, and we emphasize again that our main result does not require this condition. 9 For a semi-martingale probability measure P, we denote by Ft+ := ∩s>tFs its right-continuous limit, and by F P t+ the corresponding completion under P. The completed right-continuous filtration is denoted by F P + .
In the present context, all control models M = (P, α) ∈ M are equivalent to the measure P ′ , and defined by the density dP
The Hamiltonian H reduces to
so that the reduced contract is defined by
where the dependence on the process Γ disappears. In order to prove Theorem 3.6, we shall now justify that any contract ξ ∈ Ξ can be represented in the form ξ = Y Z T , P ′ −a.s. thus reducing our result to the problem of solving the following backward SDE:
For the next statement, we recall that the inclusion {Y Proof. The condition V = ∅ implies that Ξ = ∅. For all ξ ∈ Ξ, we observe that condition (2.6) implies that ξ ∈ L p ′ (P ′ ) for some p ′ > 1, by the Hölder inequality and the boundedness of λ. Furthermore, the boundedness of k, σ and λ implies that F o is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous in (y, z) and, by the H'older inequality and (2.5), we may find p > p ′′ > 1 such that:
Then, as P ′ satisfies the predictable martingale representation property and the zero-one law, the standard theory of backward SDEs guarantees existence and uniqueness of the representation (4. 
The general case
In this section, we extend the proof of Theorem 4.2 to the general context of Theorem 3.6 which bypasses Condition (4.2) in the un-controlled diffusion framework, and covers the case where Agent controls both the drift and the volatility of the output process X.
Similarly to the previous section, the critical tool is the theory of backward SDEs, but the control of volatility requires to invoke their recent extension to the second order case.
For technical reasons, we need to introduce the universal filtration
, and we denote by F U + , the corresponding right-continuous limit. Moreover, for a subset Π ⊂ Prob(Ω), we introduce the set of Π−polar sets N Π := N ⊂ Ω, N ⊂ A for some A ∈ F T with sup P∈Π P(A) = 0 , and we introduce the Π−completion of F
together with the corresponding right-continuous limit F Π + .
From fully nonlinear to semilinear Hamiltonian
We also introduce the inverse map which assigns to every squared diffusion the corresponding set of generating controls:
so that we may isolate the partial maximization with respect to the squared diffusion in the Hamiltonian H in (3.1), and define for any (y, z, γ,
F t x, y, z, Σ + 1 2 Σ : γ ,
In other words, 2H = (−2F ) * is the convex conjugate of −2F .
Isolating the control on quadratic variation
Following the approach of Soner, Touzi and Zhang [36] to second order backward SDEs, we start by Agent's problem so as to isolate the control of the quadratic variation of the output. To do this, recall the notation (5.1), and let Σ t (x, b) 1/2 be the corresponding (d, d)−symmetric square root. We observe that the driftless SDE (2.4) can be converted into
Indeed, any solution (P, β) of (2.4) is also a solution of (5.3) by the Lévy characterization of Brownian motion. Conversely, let (P, β) be a solution of (5.3), and let W := (W o , W 1 ) be an n−dimensional Brownian motion extending the original Brownian motion W o . Let R n denote the set of all matrices of rotations R of R n , i.e. RR ⊤ = I n , and let R o denote the (d, n)−matrix consisting of the d first rows of R, and R 1 the (n − d, n)−matrix consisting of the n − d remaining rows of R. Notice that dW t = R ⊤ dW t defines a Brownian motion, again by the Lévy characterization of Brownian motion. Let {R t , t ∈ [0, T ]} be an R n −valued optional process with R 0 t (x) := Σ t (x, β t ) −1/2 σ t (x, β t ). Here, Σ t (x, β t ) −1/2 denotes the pseudoinverse of Σ t (x, β t ) 1/2 . Then, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
which means that (P, β) is a solution of the SDE (2.4). Let
weak solution of (2.4) for some β , and we observe that for all weak solution (P o , β) of (2.4), we havê
Similar to the previous Section 4, for any fixed diffusion coefficient, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions of (2.1) and (2.4) characterized by means of the Girsanov theorem. From the above discussion, we see that, by introducing
we may define a one-to-one correspondence between the set of control models M and the set
as follows:
Then, it follows from the Girsanov theorem that (P ν , ν) ∈ M. Notice that the choice of R 1 is irrelevant. We may then re-write Agent's problem as
We conclude this subsection by providing a formal derivation of the representation needed for the proof of our main Theorem 3.6. The rigorous justification is reported in the subsequent subsections by means of second order backward SDEs.
For all fixed P o ∈ P o , the value V A (ξ, P o ) is that of a stochastic control problem with fixed quadratic variation. By the same argument as that of the previous section, we have the backward SDE representation
we next justify from the dynamic programming principle that the corresponding dynamic value function satisfies an appropriate P o −super-martingale property under each P o ∈ P o , which by the Doob-Meyer decomposition leads to the representation:
, and therefore K = 0, P o ⋆ −a.s. In general, there is no guarantee that such an optimal measure exists, and we therefore account for the minimality of K through the condition inf
This is exactly the representation that we will obtain rigorously from second order backward SDEs, and that we will exploit in order to prove our main Theorem 3.6.
Remark 5.1. Another formal justification of our approach is the following. Suppose that the representation
holds true, recall that all measures in P are equivalent to some corresponding measure on P o . Recall the definition of F in (5.2), and definė
By direct substitution in the above representation of ξ, we get
By definition of F , notice thatK t ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], andK t vanishes whenever σ 2 t achieves the maximum in the definition of H in terms of F , i.e. on the support of any measure under which the density of the quadratic variation is such a maximizer. Since the supremum may not be attained, we write as a substitute
The last representation of ξ by means of the triplet (Y, Z, K) differs from (5.5) only by the slight relaxation on the non-decreasing process K dropping the requirement of absolute continuity with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
2BSDE characterization of Agent's problem
We now provide a representation of Agent's value function by means of second order backward SDEs (2BS-DEs, hereafter) as introduced by Soner, Touzi and Zhang [36] . We use crucially recent results of Possamaï, Tan and Zhou [30] , to bypass the regularity conditions in [36] .
Given an admissible contract ξ, we consider the following 2BSDE
The following definition recalls the notion of 2BSDE, and uses the additional notation
Definition 5.2. We say that (Y, Z, K) is a solution of the 2BSDE (5.7) if, for some p > 1, (i) Y is a càdlàg and
(iii) K is a F P o −optional, non-decreasing, starting from K 0 = 0, and satisfying the minimality condition
This definition differs slightly from that of Soner, Touzi and Zhang [36] and Possamaï, Tan and Zhou [30] , as the non-decreasing process K is here assumed to be aggregated. This is possible due to Nutz's [27] aggregation result of stochastic integrals, which holds true under the continuum hypothesis which is assumed to hold in the present paper. Since the processes Y and Z are aggregated, the fact that Z · dX is aggregated implies that the remaining term K in the decomposition (5.7) is also aggregated. 
(ii) Since k, σ, λ are bounded, it follows from the definition of admissible controls that F satisfies the integrability and Lipschitz continuity assumptions required in [30] . Indeed, -For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω, and Σ ∈ Σ Σ t (x)
-We also directly check from Condition (2.5) on the cost function c, together with [35, Lemma 6.2] that sup
-The dynamic programming requirements of [30, Assumption 2.1] follow from the more general results given in El Karoui and Tan [15, 16] (see also Nutz and van Handel [28] ).
-Finally, as ξ satisfies the integrability condition (2.6) for some p > 1, the required well-posedness result is a direct consequence of [35 We now relate Agent's problem to the 2BSDE.
Proof. (i) By [30, Theorem 4.2] , the solution of the 2BSDE (5.7) is the supremum of solutions of BSDEs:
where for all
is the solution of the backward SDE under P o :
with a càdlàg (F
where c ν r := c r (ν r ) and similar notations apply to k ν , σ β , λ α . Let P ν be the probability measure, equivalent to P, defined as in (5.4). Then, it follows from Girsanov's theorem that
We now observe the conditions of Corollary 3.1 in El Karoui, Peng and Quenez [14] are satisfied in our context, namely, the affine generators in (5.10) are equi-Lipschitz and there is an ε−maximizerν o ∈ U(P o ) for all ε > 0 which obviously induces a weak solution of the corresponding SDE by the Girsanov theorem. This provides a representation of Y P o 0 as a stochastic control representation for all P o ∈ P o :
see also [30, Lemma A.3] . We observe here that the presence of the orthogonal martingale M P o does not induce any change in the argument of [14] . Then, for all P o ∈ P o , we have P o −a.s.
where the last equality follows from the decomposition of Subsection 5.2. By similar arguments as in the proofs of Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 5.2 of [30] , we may then conclude that
(ii) By the above equalities, an optimal control must be such that all the essential suprema above are attained. The one in (5.9) is clearly attained if and only if the corresponding measure in P o is such that K = 0 on its support. Similarly, by the result of El Karoui, Peng and Quenez [14] , the supremum in (5.11) is attained for control processes which maximize F .
Proof of Theorem 3.6
The last statement of the theorem, characterizing optimal contracts by means of the solution of the reduced problem inf Y0≥R V (Y 0 ), is a direct consequence of the equality
was already stated in Proposition 3.4. To prove the converse inequality we recall that the conditiopn V = ∅ implies that Ξ = ∅. For an arbitrary ξ ∈ Ξ, our strategy is to prove that Principal's objective function J P (ξ) can be approximated by
Step 1: Let (Y, Z, K) be the solution of the 2BSDE (5.7), where we recall again that the aggregated process K exists as a consequence of the aggregation result of Nutz [27] , see [30, Remark 4.1] . We recall that the integrability condition (2.6) implies that Y D o
We next define for any t ∈ [0, T ] the process
6 Special cases and examples
Coefficients independent of x
In Theorem 3.9, we saw that Principal's problem involves both x and y as state variables. We now identify conditions under which Principal's problem can be somewhat simplified, for example by reducing the number of state variables. We first provide conditions under which Agent's participation constraint is binding.
We assume that σ, λ, c, k, and k P are independent of x. (6.1)
In this case, the Hamiltonian H introduced in (3.1) is also independent of x, and we re-write the dynamics of the controlled process
By classical comparison result of stochastic differential equation, this implies that the flow Y Z,Γ s is increasing in terms of the corresponding initial condition Y 0 . Thus, optimally, Principal will provide Agent with the minimum reservation utility R he requires. In other words, we have the following simplification of Principal's problem, as a direct consequence of Theorem 3.6.
Proposition 6.1. Assuming (6.1), we have V P = V (R).
We now consider cases in which the number of state variables is reduced.
Example 6.2 (Exponential utility).
(i) Let U (y) := −e −ηy , and assume k ≡ 0. Then, under the conditions of Proposition 6.1, it follows that
Consequently, the HJB equation of Theorem 3.9, corresponding to V , may be reduced to two state variables by applying the change of variables v(t, x, y) = e ηy f (t, x).
(ii) Assume in addition that, for some h ∈ R d , the liquidation function is linear, ℓ(x) = h · x. Then, it follows that
where the HJB equation of Theorem 3.9 corresponding to V has been reduced to an ODE on [0, T ] by applying the change of variables v(t, x, y) = e −η(h·x−R) f (t).
Example 6.3 (Risk-neutral Principal). Let U (x) := x, and assume k ≡ 0. Then, under the conditions of Proposition 6.1, it follows that
Consequently, the HJB equation of Theorem 3.9 corresponding to V can be reduced to [0, T ] × R d by applying the change of variables v(t, x, y) = −y + f (t, x).
6.2 Drift control and quadratic cost: Cvitanić, Wan and Zhang [8] We now consider the only tractable case from Cvitanić, Wan and Zhang [8] .
Suppose ξ = U A (C T ) where U A is Agent's utility function, and C T is the contract payment. Then, we need to replace ξ by U −1 A (ξ), where the inverse function is assumed to exist. Assume that d = n = 1 and, for some constants c > 0, σ > 0,
That is, the volatility is uncontrolled (as in Section 4) and the output is of the form
and Agent and Principal are respectively maximizing
denoting Principal utility U P instead of U . In particular, and this is important for tractability, the cost of drift effort α is quadratic.
We recover the following result from [8] using our approach, and under a different set of technical conditions. Proposition 6.4. Assume that Principal's value function v(t, x, y) is the solution of its corresponding HJB equation, in which the supremum over (z, γ) is attained at the solution (z ⋆ , γ ⋆ ) to the first order conditions, and that v is in class C 2,3,3 on its domain, including at t = T . Then, we have, for some constant L,
In particular, the optimal contract C T satisfies the following equation, almost surely,
Moreover, if this equation has a unique solution C T = C(X T ), if the BSDE under the Wiener measure P 0
has a unique solution (P, Z), and if Agent's value function is the solution of its corresponding HJB equation in which the supremum over α is attained at the solution α ⋆ to the first order condition, then the contract C(X T ) is optimal.
Thus, the optimal contract C T is a function of the terminal value X T only. This can be considered as a moral hazard modification of the Borch rule valid in the so-called first best case: the ratio of Principal's and Agent's marginal utilities is constant under first best risk-sharing, that is, in the case in which Principal can herself choose Agent's effort, but here, that ratio is a linear function of the Principal's utility.
Proof. Agent's Hamiltonian is maximized by α ⋆ (z) = 1 c σz. The HJB equation for Principal's value function v = v P of Theorem 3.9 becomes then, with
Optimizing over z gives
We have that v(t, X t , Y t ) is a martingale under the optimal measure P , satisfying
Thus, the volatility of v is σ times
We also have, by Itō's rule,
.
Thus, the volatility of v y is σ times
that is, equal to the minus volatility of v divided by c. For the first statement, it only remains to prove that the drift of v y (t, X t , Y t ) is zero. This drift is equal to
However, note that the HJB equation can be written as
and that differentiating it with respect to y gives
Using this, it is readily seen that the above expression for the drift is equal to zero.
Next, denoting by W 0 the Brownian motion for which dX t = σdW 0 t , from (3.4) we have
and thus, by Itô's rule
Suppose now the offered contract C T = C(X T ) is the one determined by equation (6.2). Agent's optimal effort isα = σV A x /c, where Agent's value function V A satisfies
Using Ito's rule, this implies that the P 0 −martingale processes e V A (t,Xt)/c and e Y (t)/c satisfy the same stochastic differential equation. Moreover, they are equal almost surely at t = T because V A (T, X T ) = Y T = U A (C(X T )), hence, by the uniqueness of the solution of the BSDE, they are equal for all t, and, furthermore, V A x (t, X t ) = Z ⋆ (t). This implies that Agent's effortα induced by C(X T ) is the same as the effort α ⋆ optimal for Principal, and both Agent and Principal get their optimal expected utilities.
We now present a completely solvable example of the above model from [8] , solved here using our approach.
Example 6.5. Risk-neutral principal and logarithmic agent [8] . In addition to the above assumptions, suppose, for notational simplicity, that c = 1. Assume also that Principal is risk-neutral while Agent is risk averse with
We also assume that the model for X is, with σ > 0 being a positive constant,
Thus, X t > 0 for all t. We will show that the optimal contract payoff C T satisfies
This can be seen directly from (6.2), or as follows. Similarly as in the proof above (replacing σ with σx), the HJB equation of Theorem 3.9 is
It is straightforward to verify that the solution is given by
We have, denoting E(t) := e σ 2 (T −t) − 1,
and therefore
Hence, from (3.4),
Since e YT = C T , we get C T = 1 2 X T + const.
6.3 Volatility control with no cost: Cadenillas, Cvitanić and Zapatero [5] We now apply our method to the main model of interest in Cadenillas, Cvitanić and Zapatero [5] . That paper considered the risk-sharing problem between Agent and Principal, when choosing the first best choice of volatility β t , with no moral hazard, that is, the case in which Principal chooses both the contract and the effort of Agent. In that case, it is possible to apply convex duality methods to solve the problem 10 .
Suppose again that ξ = U A (C T ) where U A is Agent's utility function, and C T is the contract payment. Assume also for some constants c > 0, σ > 0 that the output is of the form, for a one-dimensional Brownian motion W , 11 and a fixed constant λ, dX t = λβ t dt + β t dW t .
We assume that Agent is maximizing E[U A (C T )] and Principal is maximizing E[U P (X T −C T )]. In particular, there is zero cost of volatility effort β. This is a standard model for portfolio management, in which β has the interpretation of the vector of positions in risky assets.
Since there is no cost of effort, first best is attained, i.e., Principal can offer a constant payoff C such that U A (C) = R, and Agent will be indifferent with respect to which action β to apply. Nevertheless, we look for a possibly different contract, which would provide Agent with strict incentives. We recover the following result from [5] using our approach, and under a different set of technical conditions. Proposition 6.6. Given constants κ and λ, consider the following ODE
3)
and boundary condition F (0) = λ, with a solution (if exists) denoted F (x) = F (x; κ, λ). Consider the set S of (κ, λ) such that a solution F exists, and if Agent is offered the contract C T = F (X T ), his value function V (t, x) = V (t, x; κ, λ) solves the corresponding HJB equation, in which the supremum over β is attained at the solution β ⋆ to the first order conditions, and V is a C 2,3 function on its domain, including at t = T . With W T denoting a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and variance T , suppose there exists m 0 such that
is equal to Principal's expected utility in the first best risk-sharing, for the given Agent's expected utility R. Assume also that there exists (κ 0 , λ 0 ) ∈ S such that κ 0 = m 0 /V x (0, X 0 ; κ 0 , λ 0 ), and that Agent's optimal expected utility under the contract C T = F (X T ; κ 0 , λ 0 ) is equal to his reservation utility R. Then, under that contract, Agent will choose actions that will result in Principal attaining her corresponding first best expected utility.
Note that the action process β chosen by Agent is not necessarily the same as the action process Principal would dictate as the first best when paying Agent with cash. However, the expected utilities are the same as the first best. We also mention that [5] present a number of examples for which the assumptions of the proposition are satisfied, and in which, indeed, (6.3) provides the optimal contract.
Proof. Suppose the offered contract is of the form C T = F (X T ) for some function F for which Agent's value function V (t, x) satisfies V xx < 0 and the corresponding HJB equation, given by
We get that Agent's optimal action is β ⋆ = −λ Vx Vxx and the HJB equation becomes
On the other hand, using Ito's rule, we get
Differentiating the HJB equation for V with respect to x, we see that the drift term is zero, and we have
The solution V x (t, X t ) to the SDE is a martingale given by V x (t, X t ) = V x (0, X 0 )M t , where M t := e From the boundary condition we get
On the other hand, it is known from [5] that the first best utility for Principal is attained if
where m 0 is chosen so that Agent's participation constraint is satisfied. If we choose F that satisfies the ODE (6.3), with κ 0 satisfying κ 0 = m 0 /V x (0.X 0 ; κ 0 , λ 0 ), then (6.4) is satisfied and we are done.
We now present a way to arrive at condition (6.4) using our approach. For a given (z, γ), Agent maximizes λβz + 1 2 γβ 2 , thus the optimal β is, assuming γ < 0,
The HJB equation of Theorem 3.9 becomes then, with U = U P , and w = z/γ, From the boundary condition we get that the optimal contract payoff satisfies
Conclusions
We consider a very general Principal-Agent problem, with a lump-sum payment at the end of the contracting period. While we develop a simple to use approach, our proofs rely on deep results from the recent theory of backward stochastic differential equations of the second order. The method consists of considering only the contracts that allow a dynamic programming representation of the agent's value function, for which it is straightforward to identify the agent's incentive compatible effort, and then showing that this leads to no loss of generality. While our method encompasses most existing continuous-time Brownian motion models with only the final lump-sum payment, it remains to be extended to the model with possibly continuous payments. While that might involve technical difficulties, the road map we suggest is clear -identify the generic dynamic programming representation of the agent's value process, express the contract payments in terms of the value process, and optimize the principal's objective over such payments.
